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CASE NOTES
Constitutional Law-FREEDOM OF SPEECH-ORDINANCE RE-
STRICTING SOLICITATION OF FUNDS BY CHARITIES RESTRICTS FREEDOM
OF SPEECH-Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Envi-
ronment, 444 U.S. 620 (1980).
The Village of Schaumburg (Schaumburg), a municipal corpora-
tion on the outskirts of Chicago, enacted an ordinance which re-
quired charitable organizations to obtain a permit to solicit door-
to-door.1 The ordinance provided that an organization applying for
a permit must show that seventy-five percent of the proceeds
would be directly used for its charitable purpose. The ordinance
further specified that salaries of solicitors, as well as administrative
and fundraising expenses, could not be included in determining the
percentage used for the charitable purpose.'
Citizens For A Better Environment (CBE), a charitable organi-
zation which advocates protection of the environment, was denied
a solicitation permit because it failed to meet the seventy-five per-
cent requirement. CBE brought suit in federal district court, alleg-
ing that such a requirement violated the first and fourteenth
amendments. s CBE based its claim on the fact that, in addition to
soliciting funds, the canvassers distribute literature and discuss
topics of an environmental nature. Therefore, denial of the right to
solicit violated CBE's first amendment freedom of speech rights.4
Schaumburg, on the other hand, alleged that CBE raises funds
which are primarily used for the salaries of its employees, as op-
1. Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620, 623 n.2 (1980) setting
forth SCHAUMBURG, ILL., CODE ch. 22, art. III, §§ 22-19-22-24 (1974) ("An Ordinance Regu-
lating Soliciting By Charitable Organizations"). It provides that "[e]very charitable organi-
zation, which solicits or intends to solicit contributions from persons in the village by door-
to-door solicitation or the use of public streets and public ways, shall prior to such solicita-
tion apply for a permit." 444 U.S. at 620, 623. Charitable organizations are defined as "[any
benevolent, philanthropic, patriotic, not-for-profit, or eleemosynary group, association or
corporation, or such organization purporting to be such, which solicits and collects funds for
charitable purposes" in § 22-19 of the ordinance. 444 U.S. at 623 n.2.
2. Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620, 624 (1980) setting
forth SCHAUMBURO, ILL. CODE ch. 22, art. I, § 22-20 (g) (1974). Permit applications must
contain "[siatisfactory proof that at least seventy-five percent of the proceeds of such solici-
tations will be used directly for the charitable purpose of the organization."
3. Citizens For A Better Environment v. Schaumburg, No. 76-c-470 (N. Ill. E.D.)
4. Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610 (1976); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516
(1945); Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296
(1940); Schneider v. Irvington, 308 U.S. 147 (1939); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
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posed to being used for a charitable purpose; therefore, CBE must
meet the stricter requirements for a commercial peddler before be-
ing issued a permit.5 The district court granted summary judgment
for CBE, stating that the ordinance was void on its face because it
censored freedom of speech which is protected by the first and
fourteenth amendments.$
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed.7 Al-
though the court stated that the seventy-five percent requirement
might be valid for the more traditional charities, 8 it concluded that
the requirement was unreasonable and an infringement of the first
and fourteenth amendments. Such a requirement restricts solicita-
tion by advocacy oriented groups which are more likely to incur
greater operating costs, making them ineligible for the permit.'
The court distinguished a fifth circuit opinion, National Founda-
tion v. City of Fort Worth,10 which upheld a similar type of ordi-
nance limiting the costs of solicitation to twenty percent of the
amount collected. That ordinance, however, allowed organizations
with costs in excess of the limitation to show that their costs were
not unreasonable. The court stated that "[a] fixed percentage limi-
tation on the costs of solicitation might be undesirable and inap-
plicable if applied to all types of charitable organizations.""
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to review
the court of appeal's holding that the Schaumburg ordinance vio-
5. Schaumburg v. Citizens For A Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620, 622-23 n.1 (1980)
setting forth SCHAUMBURG, ILL., CODE ch. 22, art. 11 §§ 22-6-22-18 (1974). Article II regu-
lates commercial solicitation by requiring "for profit peddlers and solicitors" to acquire a
commercial license. A commercial peddler must disclose whether he has ever been arrested
for a misdemeanor or felony and can be denied a license if found to be a person of poor
character or reputation. No similar disclosures are required of charitable solicitors.
6. Citizens For A Better Environment v. Schaumburg, No. 76-c-470 (N. l. E.D.).
7. Citizens For A Better Environment v. Schaumburg, 590 F.2d 220 (7th Cir. 1978). The
court rejected Schaumburg's contention that summary judgment could not be granted be-
cause there was an issue of fact as to the nature of CBE's charitable purpose. The court
looked only to CBE's challenge to the facial validity of the ordinance. See NAACP v. But-
ton, 371 U.S. 415, 432 (1963) (In a first amendment challenge, the petitioner may question
the validity of a statute whether or not he or she is directly affected by it.).
8. Although the court of appeals failed to define "the more traditional charitable organi-
zations," the Supreme Court indicated that the more traditional charities are those which
simply act as agents to transfer funds to other charities or provide money and services to
the poor while the other types of charitable organizations, such as CBE, engage in research,
litigation, lobbying, and other educational and charitable activities. Schaumburg v. Citizens
For A Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620, 635 (1980).
9. See text infra, at note 46.
10. 415 F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1969).
11. Id. at 46.
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lated the first and fourteenth amendments." The Court in
Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment's affirmed,
holding that the ordinance was overbroad because the seventy-five
percent limitation "is a direct and substantial limitation on pro-
tected activity,' 4 i.e., solicitation of funds. The Court further
stated that such a restriction "cannot be sustained unless it serves
a sufficiently strong, subordinating interest that the Village is enti-
tled to protect."1 Upon a detailed analysis of Schaumburg's "prof-
fered justifications," the Court concluded that the ordinance could
not withstand scrutiny under the first amendment.' 6
The Supreme Court is continually searching for an equitable
balance between restrictions that may legitimately be imposed and
the first amendment rights that will necessarily be infringed
upon. 7 A long line of cases leaves no doubt that charitable solicita-
tion is a protected first amendment activity.' 8 The regulation of
free expression must contain no more restrictions than those abso-
lutely necessary to further the interest being served.' 9 In other
words, a restriction upon charitable solicitation of funds must
serve a justifiable and compelling state interest. It cannot be a
means for the arbitrary suppression of certain kinds of speech or
activities.
Many of the cases involving restrictions on solicitation have
dealt with the issue of whether discretionary judgment is permissi-
ble in determining who can solicit. The Court has consistently held
that leaving the issuance of a permit or the granting of permission
to solicit within the discretion of an official is unconstitutional. 0
Despite the fact that the Schaumburg ordinance did not allow for
discretion and appeared to follow prior decisions, the court of ap-
12. Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620 (1980).
13. Id.
14. Id. at 636.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. See Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 275 (1951): "Adjustment of the inevitable
conflict between free speech and other interests is a problem as persistent as it is perplex-
ing." (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
18. Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610 (1976); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516
(1945); Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296
(1940); Schneider v. Irvington, 308 U.S. 147 (1939); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
19. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968).
20. Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610 (1976); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S.
296 (1940); Schneider v. Irvington, 308 U.S. 147 (1939); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444
(1938).
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peals held the ordinance unconstitutional. 21 The court based its
holding on factors other than discretion. 2
The Supreme Court, upon review, did not attempt to explain
why an ordinance which does not allow for discretion, therefore ap-
pearing within the boundaries of past decisions, is unconstitu-
tional."s Thus, the Court, which has long held any allowance of dis-
cretion to be unconstitutional, has now declared an ordinance
which does not allow for discretion to be unconstitutional as well.
The question left unanswered is what type of ordinance would pass
constitutional muster. An examination of prior decisions is helpful
in understanding the nature of the problem posed by this question.
The earliest relevant case is Lovell v. Griffin, 4 decided in 1938,
in which the Supreme Court invalidated a municipal ordinance
prohibiting the distribution of literature of any kind, at any time
or place, without prior written permission from the city manager.
The Court held that the ordinance was overbroad because it was
not limited to an effort to maintain public order, prevent disor-
derly conduct, or protect the city's residents. Lovell is a pivotal
case because ordinances of a similar type had previously been up-
held by numerous state courts."5 This decision laid a foundation
for later cases which gave the Court the opportunity to further
clarify its position.
The next two relevant Supreme Court cases involved solicita-
tions by religious groups. The Court struck down the ordinances in
both because the issuance of a permit involved the exercise of dis-
cretion of a state or city official. In Schneider v. Irvington," a mu-
nicipal ordinance stated that no one could canvass, solicit, or dis-
tribute circulars house-to-house without obtaining a written permit
from the chief of police. The Court held this to be an unconstitu-
tional denial of free speech because, in the discretion of the chief
of police, the permit could be refused if the canvasser was not of
21. 590 F.2d at 226.
22. Id. at 223-25. First amendment considerations were at the forefront of the court's
analysis. The court found the right of free speech and expression, as well as the dissemina-
tion and receipt of ideas, to be controlling. Via the first amendment analysis, the court
ultimately concluded that the Schaumburg ordinance had unreasonably obstructed the col-
lection of funds.
23. 444 U.S. 620 (1980).
24. 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
25. Z. CHAFEE, Frm SPIMCH IN Tnz UmirrR STATEs 401 (1969). See, e.g., Massachusetts v.
Kimball, 13 N.E.2d 18 (Mass. 1938); Coughlin v. Sullivan, 126 A. 177 (N.J. 1924); Milwaukee
v. Kassen, 234 N.W. 352 (Wis. 1931).
26. 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
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good character.2 The Court emphasized that a municipality could
enact regulations in the interest of public safety and welfare, and
could "lawfully regulate the conduct of those using the streets," so
long as the fundamental rights of freedom of speech and press
were not abridged. 8
The second case, Cantwell v. Connecticut", involved Jehovah's
Witnesses who were convicted in state court of violating a statute
which forbade solicitation by religious or charitable organizations
without official approval. The Court, in reversing the convictions,
held that "[the general regulation, in the public interest, of solici-
tation ... [which] does not unreasonably obstruct or delay the col-
lection of funds is not open to any constitutional objection .... ,,0
The Court found, however, that the requirement of a license, the
issuance of which rests upon the "determination by state authority
as to what is a religious cause," 1 is an invalid prior restraint on
freedom of religion and speech."
Prior to Valentine v. Chrestensen,38 the solicitation cases re-
viewed by the Supreme Court concerned only religious or charita-
ble organizations. In Valentine, however, the Court distinguished
between charitable solicitation and commercial solicitation. The
Court held that commercial speech was not protected by the first
amendment and was therefore subject to greater restraints." There
remained the problem of how to distinguish between commercial
and non-commercial leaflets. Inevitably, a subjective test would
have to be used to determine the principle purpose of the leaflets.8 5
The Court apparently did not consider the use of discretion in this
manner to be unconstitutional, despite the fact that this could
amount to a prior restraint if a non-commercial solicitor had to
27. Id. at 164-65.
28. Id. at 160.
29. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
30. Id. at 305.
31. Id. at 307.
32. Id. at 306. See also Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419
(1971); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
33. 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
34. Id. at 54. But see Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748 (1976), where the Court struck down a Virginia statute that prohibited adver-
tising and thereby determined that commercial speech is protected by the first amendment.
Thus, the law of Valentine no longer applies. However, the Court in Schaumburg found
that, in examining the historical perspective of past decisions, the distinction between com-
mercial and non-commercial speech is noteworthy. 444 U.S. at 632.
35. Resnik, Freedom of Speech and Commercial Solicitation, 30 CAL. L. Rav. 655, 657
(1942).
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prove his material was indeed non-commercial.
The Court has, for a variety of reasons, struck down several
other attempts to limit solicitation. For example, an ordinance
which prohibited door-to-door distribution of leaflets and handbills
was invalidated because the right of the homeowner to warn off
solicitors is considered sufficient protection for his privacy when
balanced against the weightier rights of free speech and religion.86
In contrast, the Court upheld an ordinance which prohibited door-
to-door solicitation for the sale of goods without prior consent of
the occupants, reasoning that the homeowners' privacy outweighs
freedom of speech.37 Once again, the Court drew a distinction be-
tween commercial and non-commercial solicitation of funds."
The most recent Supreme Court case on point, prior to Schaum-
burg, is Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell," which invalidated for vague-
ness an ordinance requiring persons wishing to solicit door-to-door
for a political or charitable purpose to register for identification.
The Court reaffirmed its previous decisions in upholding a munici-
pality's authority to protect its citizens by the regulation of solici-
tation. The Court further stated that "[a] narrowly drawn ordi-
nance, that does not vest in municipal officials the undefined
power to determine what messages residents will hear"' 0 would not
violate the first amendment.
Throughout the cases just cited, the overriding and irrefutable
theme has been that the solicitaion of funds is an expression of
free speech. Therefore, to prohibit or unnecessarily restrict this
type of solicitation is an infringement upon the first amendment.
The Schaumburg decision is illustrative of the Court's continuing
search for the types of restrictions that may legitimately be im-
posed upon a protected first amendment activity such as the chari-
table solicitation of funds. The Court acknowledged Schaumburg's
substantial interest in protecting its citizens from fraud and unnec-
essary annoyance, but held that the seventy-five percent require-
ment was of slight value in promoting those interests.41
Schaumburg claimed that the ordinance was necessary to protect
its residents. The purpose of the ordinance supposedly was to en-
sure that charitable organizations are what they say they are. How-
36. Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
37. Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951).
38. See note 34 supra.
39. 425 U.S. 610 (1976).
40. Id. at 616-17.
41. 444 U.S. at 636.
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ever, if Schaumburg's justification for the ordinance was to prevent
fraud, it could have done so by less restrictive means than the sev-
enty-five percent requirement.4'
On its face, the Schaumburg ordinance appeared to be constitu-
tional in that it followed precedent by not allowing for discretion
in the issuance of permits.4" The absence of discretionary judg-
ment, however, does not ensure that this type of ordinance will be
upheld, as is apparent by the Court's decision. Such an inflexible
ordinance would limit the types of charitable organization that
could solicit funds and would arbitrarily suppress the types of
speech that the residents of Schaumburg could be exposed to. This
becomes more evident upon inquiry into the effects of such an
ordinance.
The inflexibility of the seventy-five percent requirement would
bar many types of charities, including many of the more tradi-
tional ones, from soliciting funds." Schaumburg did not offer an
explanation of how the seventy-five percent figure was determined,
and statistics do not support that figure as an accurate portrayal of
the amount of funds that a charity would normally use "directly"
for its charitable purpose. 5
Newly formed organizations that support unpopular causes are
especially likely to be barred from soliciting. They are far more
likely to employ paid solicitors and incur greater operating costs,
as opposed to the more traditional charities that can more readily
rely upon volunteers. Hence, the ordinance is, in effect, promoting
the causes of the more traditional types of charities while discour-
aging those of advocacy-oriented charities."
An equally important consideration is that the residents of
Schaumburg have a right to be exposed to the concepts that CBE
advocates. By prohibiting CBE from soliciting, the ordinance de-
nies these people the opportunity not only to hear CBE's views,
but the right to decide whether or not to contribute. Schaumburg
42. 444 U.S. at 637-3S. Penal laws could have been enacted to prohibit and punish
fraudulent misrepresentations, or public disclosure of finances could be required.
43. See note 18 supra.
44. See note 8 supra.
45. See Gross, Costs of Fusndraising, PHRANTHROPY MONTHLY (March 1975). This article
reported a study of the largest organizations in Illinois which solicit funds. It showed an
average fund-raising cost of twenty-six percent.
46. See note 8 supra.
47. See Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 757 (1976); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 408-09 (1974); Kleindienst v. Mandel,
408 U.S. 753, 762-63 (1972); Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943).
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claimed that the ordinance was protecting the privacy of its resi-
dents,4 8 but surely this interest was outweighed by the resulting
infringement upon the residents' first amendment rights. The first
amendment protects the dissemination and receipt of ideas.49
In its holding, the Court distinguished National Foundation by
noting that the Schaumburg ordinance differed because it did not
allow for a showing that costs were reasonable.50 Thus, the Court
implicitly approved the ordinance in National Foundation as an
appropriate alternative to the inflexibility of the Schaumburg
ordinance. 1
Although National Foundation is not controlling, it appears to
contain the answer to the question left unanswered by Schaum-
burg. Some discretion in the issuance of solicitation permits would
have to be left to authorities because inquiries into the internal
affairs and nature of organizations would be necessary to deter-
mine if costs are reasonable. The Court, in Schaumburg, correctly
declared the ordinance unconstitutional, basing its holding on the
more obvious effects of the ordinance, rather that addressing the
issue of discretion. As a result of this gap in the opinion, the Court
unfortunately did not create a clear guideline for the enactment of
future ordinances. Had the discretion issue been squarely faced by
the Court, it is reasonable to speculate that National Foundation
would have provided the needed "middle ground" as a basis for
determining the amount of permissible official discretion.
JANET JACOBOWrrz
48. See Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728 (1970); Martin v.
Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
49. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 408-09 (1974).
50. See text at notes 10-11, supra.
51. Id. Justice Rehnquist, the sole dissenter in Schaumburg, found the Court's tacit
approval of the ordinance in National Foundation "somewhat surprising" and further
stated that "[gliven the potential for abuse of this open-ended grant of discretion, I would
think that Fort Worth's ordinance would be more, not less, suspect than Schaumburg's."
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 444 U.S. at 643 n.1.
